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Canadian armed forces
under United States
command
IN JANUARY 2002, IT BECAME APPARENT that negotiations were under
way to place a substantial part of the Canadian armed forces - land and
sea forces as well as air - under the operational control of a permanent,
integrated command structure under United States leadership. The
creation of a 'Northern Command' in April 2002 unified the conti-
nental United States into a single military command and provided a
logical precursor to an expansion that would include Canada and
Canadian forces.' A number of difficult questions will have to be
answered before the Canadian government could responsibly embark
on closer military co-operation of this kind.
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UNITED NATIONS/NATO/NORAD OPERATIONS
Canadian soldiers have in the past functioned under United States
command in operations authorized by the United Nations, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and in the North American
Aerospace Defence Command. The first operation authorized by the
United Nations Security Council was the 1950 intervention in Korea.
Subsequent operations include the 1991 Gulf War and the interven-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-5. Canada has also placed its sol-
diers under foreign command within peacekeeping operations autho-
rized by the General Assembly. Those operations are not contentious:
the Council and the Assembly operate under the United Nations
Charter - a multilateral treaty ratified by 190 states. Although
American commanders are sometimes in charge of day-to-day opera-
tions, they have the explicit, delegated authority of the international
community behind them. And these operations are, in any case, tem-
porary in scope.
As parties to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, Canada and the United
States are obligated to assist any NATO member country subject to an
armed attack. This obligation, set out in article 5, has been invoked
only once - by the United States following the 11 September 2001
attacks in New York and Washington. Even then NATO was not called
upon to engage in military action. Article 5 operations would be very
different from that which is contemplated today. NATO structures
remain largely dormant and without authority, except in those specif-
ic instances in which the members agree to activate them. Moreover,
NATO, like the United Nations, is a multilateral organization - in this
case composed of 19 states. When an American commander is placed
in charge of an operation, he acts as a NATO commander within the
multilateral structure.
Outside the context of article 5, NATO participated in operations
authorized by the Security Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And in
one instance - Kosovo - NATO acted without explicit United Nations
approval. But even then, the operation was that of a multilateral orga-
nization, subject to its authorization and control. Every target had to
be approved unanimously by all involved governments.
NORAD was designed to enable rapid responses to incursions into
Canadian or United States airspace by Soviet bombers. Its integrated
command structure is limited to one specific function - air defence -
and involves a relatively small part of the Canadian forces. Since the
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end of the cold war, the number of Canadian planes and pilots
required for NORAD duties has decreased. And pilots on intercept mis-
sions do not encounter many of the legal issues faced by ground and
naval personnel, since they do not, for example, take prisoners or lay
mines. Perhaps most importantly, the extension of the NORAD system
to land and sea forces would have implications for Canadian sover-
eignty of a scope and kind not raised by NORAD itself.
POLITICAL ISSUES
Sovereignty
Sovereignty in the 21st century is different from sovereignty in the
17th, 18th, or 19th centuries. Today, it is as much about the ability to
represent and protect one's people and engage in international rela-
tions as it is about control over resources and territory. There is noth-
ing inconsistent today about a sovereign state choosing to delegate leg-
islative or police powers to supranational institutions such as the
United Nations or the European Community.3 Nevertheless, under
any conception, control over one's armed forces is a central attribute of
a sovereign state. Western European countries, for instance, were able
to develop a common market with considerable supranational integra-
tion, including a single currency, but have yet to create an integrated
military structure (except in one very limited respect) .4
The American ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, has argued
that sovereignty is not at issue because Canada would retain command
of its armed forces; only 'operational control' would be assigned to the
Northern Command. To Cellucci, this means that Canada would
receive a request for the participation of its forces but could decline to
participate if it so chose. Consequently, 'if Canada joins the us in a
continental approach to security, Canadian sovereignty will not be
infringed even one iota."
3 Bill Graham, minister of foreign affairs, 'Affirming Canadian Sovereignty in an
Interdependent World' (Notes for an Address to the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, 4 April 2002); available at http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min Pub Docs/o5o7o.htm
4 The European 'rapid reaction force' is designed to respond more effectively to
humanitarian crises abroad. Until a crisis arises, and troops and equipment are
sent, those troops remain under the sole command of their home state.
5 Paul Cellucci, 'North American Security,' Canadian Defence Industries Association
CANSEC Dinner, 14 February 2002, Ottawa; available at www.cdia.ca/ambassador_
cellucci.htm.
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There are two problems with this argument. First, the definition of
operational control' in the 1958 exchange of notes that created NORAD
is broad and includes many of the powers civilians would envisage as
falling within 'command' - and thus as involving a delegation of sover-
eignty: '"Operational Control" is the power to direct, co-ordinate, and
control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise
made available. No permanent changes of station would be made with-
out approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary
reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the inter-
national border, to meet operational requirements will be within the
authority of commanders having operational control The basic com-
mand organization for the air defence forces of the two countries,
including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit
training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to
their national authorities.'6
Second, there is an important distinction between the theoretical
ability and the real ability to withdraw from international commit-
ments. The members of the European Union, United Nations,
International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization are in
theory all able to withdraw from those organizations, just as all states
are free - with appropriate notice - to withdraw from their obligations
under international treaties. But nobody doubts that the members of
the EU and other international organizations have delegated aspects of
their sovereignty, sometimes in quite significant ways. The fact is that
for most countries, withdrawal from many international mechanisms
is hardly a practical option. At issue here is not Canada's legal sover-
eignty, but its practical sovereignty - its ability freely to make choices at
the international level. 7
Moreover, the United States might occasionally abuse mechanisms
designed to protect Canadian sovereignty. During the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, for example, Canadian forces delegated to NORAD were
raised to a heightened level of engagement after consultation with Us
6 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American
Air Defence Command (NORAD), 1958 Canada Treaty Series 9,4 (emphasis added).
The same definition has been used in the various NORAD renewal agreements.
7 This reality has not stopped Canada's Department of National Defence from argu-
ing that closer integration would strengthen sovereignty, since Canada would be
exercising a choice every time it decided not to withdraw its forces. See, for exam-
ple, Department of National Defence, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Leadmark:
The Navy's Strategyfor 2020 (Ottawa: DND, 2001), 111-12.
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political leaders only, much to the consternation of Canadian authori-
ties. Concerns about sovereignty cannot be overcome by the technical
distinction between 'command' and 'operational control.'
Delegating a central aspect of sovereignty to the United States would
have a number of likely consequences. For instance, Canadas interna-
tional standing and multilateral influence might suffer. Already, in
Europe and elsewhere, Canadian foreign policy on some issues is seen
as largely inseparable from that of the United States. Canadians need
to think carefully before doing anything that might further diminish
their country's influence on the world stage.
As the minister of foreign affairs, Bill Graham, recently said: 'defin-
ing what we mean by "sovereignty" and clearly articulating how we
intend to affirm and promote it are more important to Canadians than
ever. Important because in today's increasingly interdependent world it
determines the choices that are available to us when we are making
decisions about the way of life we wish to develop here in our own
country and, equally importantly, it shapes the way we participate in
the global community of which we are such an integral part.'8
Jurisdiction in the Arctic
The sovereignty issue is acute in the Arctic, where jurisdiction over the
Northwest Passage is the most prominent concern. The polar icecap is
40 per cent thinner than in the 1950s.' An ice-free Northwest Passage
would provide the United States and other countries not only with a
short and relatively secure shipping route around North America but
also easy access to the energy and other riches of Alaska and the
Canadian north.
Canada has a long-standing claim to sovereignty over the Arctic
islands and waters and serious concerns about the environmental
impact of oil shipments on the fragile northern ecosystem. The United
States insists that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, open
to vessels from any country,"° and has backed its claim with action, for
8 Graham, 'Affirming Canadian sovereignty.'
9 James Brooke, 'Arctic shortcut for shipping raises new fears in Canada,' New York
Times, 20 July 2000, Al; Alanna Mitchell, 'The Northwest Passage thawed,' Globe
and Mail, 5 February 2000, All.
10 Donat Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1988); Donald Rothwell, 'The Canadian-u.s. Northwest
Passage dispute: a reassessment,' Cornell International Law Journal 26(no 2,1993),
331.
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instance in 1985 when its icebreaker, Polar Sea, made the passage with-
out Canada's permission." Once the ice melts sufficiently to make
commercial shipping viable, the United States may press its claim
again.
American submarines already operate without permission in the
Canadian Arctic, 2 and it is possible that the United States will want to
take advantage of the melting ice for the surface operation of its naval
vessels. Could American commanders claim that sending a naval vessel
into the Canadian Arctic without Canada's specific permission was
allowed under the integrated command? In other words, would closer
military co-operation entail, legally or practically, a delegation of
Canada's right to determine, on an ongoing basis, access to the
Canadian north? To what degree would a delegation of this kind - even
if based on a treaty, with a theoretical right to opt out - undermine
Canada's sovereignty claim? And what would happen if, after the devel-
opment of closer military relations, another non-military vessel were to
enter the Northwest Passage without permission? Would Canada be
able to prevent the incursion?
And what about environmental protection? Would the us military
be subject to Canadian laws, including the 1970 Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act?13 Could an agreement with profound impli-
cations for sovereignty and environmental protection be concluded
without close consultation with Canada's native peoples? What would
Nunavut's constitutional role be, in terms of any requirement of con-
sent to the creation and ongoing operation of an integrated command?
What would happen to the sovereignty operations (Sovops) of the
Canadian forces in the Arctic? Surely the us would, if it could, prevent
exercises designed specifically to support Canada's legal claim to the ter-
ritory and resources of the north? What would become of the Canadian
Rangers who patrol the Arctic to assert sovereignty? And what would
happen to the Arctic Council, a Canadian initiative that brings togeth-
er eight countries, including the us, to address the common concerns
ii Christopher Wren, 'U.S. ship's Arctic voyage draws heat in Canada,' New York
Times, i August 1985, A2. There was a similar incursion by the us oil tanker ss
Manhattan in 1969.
12 Herbert H. Denton, 'Sensing a U.S. threat to its sovereignty, Ottawa may buy
nuclear submarines,' Washington Post, 14 May 1987, A35.
13 R.S.C. 1985, vol, C.A12; reproduced in International Legal Materials 9(1970), 543.
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of the countries and people of the Arctic? Would closer bilateral mili-
tary relations impede efforts to deepen and broaden those multilateral
mechanisms? Why not engage the Arctic Council on security issues?
All of these questions should be addressed before agreeing to closer
military co-operation. A requirement of any such agreement should be
an explicit us commitment to ask Canada's permission before any us
soldiers or equipment enter the Arctic or the Northwest Passage.
Peacekeeping
Closer military co-operation could also have implications for Canada's
freedom to allocate its military resources. Even with a large increase in
defence spending, Canada's armed forces would be stretched to the
limit. Canada, after all, occupies more of the continent than does the
us and may well be expected to carry a sizeable share of the defence
burden. Would a commitment to North American defence restrict
Canada's capacity to provide soldiers and equipment for peacekeeping
and other multilateral missions overseas? Canada already participates
in fewer peacekeeping missions - in part because of its limited military
resources.
What implications would a continued reduction in peacekeeping
have for Canada's international influence? Historically, Canada has
punched above its weight in part because of a willingness to take on its
fair share of multilateral commitments. What implications would a con-
tinued reduction in peacekeeping have for Canadians' sense of national
identity as constructive members of the international community?
Canada and the United States already and inevitably have different
views on certain foreign policy issues, for example over Cuba. Such dif-
ferences could conflict with Canada's obligations under an integrated
command. What if Canada wanted to send soldiers on a peacekeeping
mission to which the us was opposed? Would the us be able to block
such a deployment, or at least make it more difficult? This question, it
should be noted, applies not only to ground forces, but also to
Canada's naval fleet, as naval participation becomes increasingly
important in peacekeeping - and with Canada's frigates destined to be
an important part of the forces subject to the integrated command. It
is one thing to say that Canada could opt out of its commitments to
the integrated command in order to free up resources for overseas
action, but quite another to take such action once the structure is in
place and the forces and equipment have been assigned.
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Peacekeeping also raises issues of military expenditure. Instead of
duplicating high-tech capabilities that the us has in abundance,
Canada might acquire more influence for its investment, and better
security, if it focused on the capacity to deploy and lead middle-power
expeditionary forces able to take on peacekeeping and peacemaking
missions overseas.
4
Foreign Policy
Even if an agreement on closer military co-operation sought to limit
itself to North America and surrounding waters, in reality, it is impos-
sible to separate out the continental theatre. For example, United
States action overseas might not directly involve Canada, but it could,
nonetheless, have ramifications for Canadian troops and equipment in
North America because heightened antagonism against the us from
abroad would require a higher level of defence at home (and greater
expense). Suppose there was an integrated command in place today
and the us launched a unilateral military campaign against Iraq.
United States forces in North America would be placed on high alert,
and a substantial portion of those forces would be transferred overseas.
But suppose that Canada did not wish to participate in - or was explic-
itly opposed to - the campaign. Could it veto an alert? Could it exclude
its forces? Would it even be consulted before its forces were put on
alert? If Canada were unable to veto or to exclude itself from an alert,
or if the political price for doing so was too high, would more of the
burden of protecting North America fall on Canada as a result of a uni-
lateral us decision on military engagement elsewhere?
Given the potential consequences of us actions for North
American defence, should Canada have a say in what the us does
abroad? Would the us allow it any say? As Joel Sokolsky explains (in
the context of naval co-operation), it is wrong to think that closer
military co-operation will enhance Canada's influence: 'convincing
allies to dispatch ships to join the USN, and encouraging them to be
as interoperable as their budgets allow, is yet another manifestation
of the American pursuit of global dominance ... Even when allies
contribute forces and there is agreement on specific tasks, there is no
14 Douglas Bland, 'Defences that impress friends and enemies,' National Post, 28
February 2002, A21; Jeffrey Simpson, 'Why we ended up dead,' Globe and Mail, 20
April 2002, A15.
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concomitant expectation that smaller contributors, such as Canada,
will therefore share in the higher strategic and political decisions asso-
ciated with the operation. Interoperability may well allow the
Canadian navy to make a useful contribution at sea, but it is not likely
to permit Ottawa greater voice or leverage in Washington."'
And what if the actions taken by the us overseas violated interna-
tional law? Would Canadas involvement in an integrated command
compromise its ability to take a separate position on the issue?
Nuclear Weapons
The us is committed, at the political level, to maintaining a substantial
nuclear arsenal. A secret Pentagon report, obtained by the New York
Times in March 2002, revealed plans to develop small new nuclear
weapons for batdefield use and suggested that nuclear weapons testing
might have to resume. 6 The Pentagon has also indicated that it will
retain rather than destroy nuclear weapons removed from active
deployment as a result of arms negotiations with Russia. 7
In the last few years, arms control treaties have been under consider-
able pressure from the us. In October 1999, the Republican majority
in the Senate refused to give consent to the ratification of the 1996
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In December 2001, the Bush admin-
istration denounced the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 8 The us
remains party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but its
actions and words indicate that it has little intention of eliminating its
nuclear arsenal. Finally, in 1995, the US argued before the International
Court of Justice that international law said nothing about whether
states are permitted to use - or to threaten to use - nuclear weapons.
Canada has long been at the forefront of efforts at arms control:
'The objective of successive Canadian Governments has been and
15 Joel J. Sokolsky, 'Sailing in concert: the politics and strategy of Canada-us naval
interoperability' Choices: National Security and Interoperability 8(April 2002), 14.
16 Michael R. Gordon, 'u.s. nuclear plan sees new targets and new weapons,' New
York Times, io March 2002, Sl, 1. See, more recently, National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/response/index.html.
17 Patrick E. Tyler, 'Russia rejects u.s. plan to store warheads,' New York Times, 11
January 2002, A8.
18 David E. Sanger, 'Bush offers arms talks to China as u.s.. pulls out of ABM Treaty,'
ibid, 14 December 2o01, Al.
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remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Canada will
continue to resist any movement to validate nuclear weapons as accept-
able currency in international politics or any attempt - de jure or de
facto - to legitimize any new nuclear-weapon state. Canada's approach
to nuclear disarmament is based on the view that the most viable and
practicable way forward is by a continuous step-by-step process to
reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons through steadily advocating
national, bilateral and multilateral steps. ' 9 Canada was one of the first
countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and strongly
promotes its ratification by others.2 0 It plays a leading role in the
United Nations Conference on Disarmament and has no desire to
acquire nuclear weapons, despite having the ability to do so. And it has
long been cautious about co-operating with the us on nuclear weapons
issues.
Participation in a us-led integrated command would mean work-
ing hand-in-glove, on an ongoing basis, with armed forces that have a
substantial nuclear component. This raises difficult legal questions -
as will be examined below - concerning Canada's arms control obliga-
tions. It also raises difficult policy questions. Do Canadians wish to
confer a degree of legitimacy on Us retention - and further develop-
ment - of the nuclear option? Would Canadian soldiers have to par-
ticipate in operations in which nuclear weapons play a potential role?
Are there any foreseeable circumstances in which us commanders
would be able to deploy nuclear weapons in Canada? How does one
protect against such situations developing without Canada's consent
if us commanders think North America is under threat and that they
have to act quickly?
Ballistic Missile Defence
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defence
Initiative, the aim of which was to develop the capability to shoot
down ballistic missiles launched at the us. President George W Bush is
pushing ahead with the scheme and has committed the us to a Ballistic
Missile Defence (BMD) system. In December 2001, he denounced the
19 www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/new-nuclear-e.asp.
20 See www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/nuclear2-e.asp. Article 14 of the CTBT stipulates
that the treaty will enter into force only after a number of specified states - includ-
ing the us -have ratified. There is, therefore, no prospect that Canada could be
bound to the CTBT unless the us was similarly bound.
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1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which, in an effort to preserve
mutual deterrence, had prohibited the development of such defences.
2
'
Canada's co-operation is essential if the system is to be implement-
ed.2 Any Russian, Chinese, North Korean, or Iraqi missiles launched
at the United States are not only likely to cross over Canadian territo-
ry but would probably have to be destroyed there, which means new
radar stations - and probably intercept launchers - on Canadian soil.23
During the cold war, radar stations were built in northern Canada,
and NORAD was created to provide an effective surveillance and inter-
cept capability because air defence co-operation was clearly in Canada's
interest; that is less obviously the case with BMD. A new arms race
between the us, Russia, and/or China would see Canada literally
caught in the middle. In allowing missile defence installations to be
built, it would become a target of any large-scale attack - though the
'rogue states' used to justify the scheme are unlikely to waste their few
missiles on Vancouver or Toronto.
An integrated command would make Canadian participation in
BMD significantly more likely. NORAD's website explicitly foresees that
NORAD will be given operational responsibility for BMD. 24 Moreover, US
ability to apply pressure to support BMD will increase once Canada is
committed to other forms of close military co-operation. The agree-
ment could thus pre-empt a full national debate over this additional,
difficult matter.
As a participant in BMD, Canada would likely be compelled to con-
tribute to its substantial costs. During the administration of Bill
Clinton, the cost of a limited system was estimated at more than us$60
billion. 25 Paying even a fraction of that amount would distort
21 Michael Gordon, 'u.s. tries defusing allies' opposition to missile defense,' New
York Times, 4 February 2001, s, i; 'In Bush's words: "Substantial advantages of
intercepting missiles early,"' ibid, 2 May 2001, Ao.
22 Jeff Sallot, 'Canada's help on missile shield crucial, u.s. ambassador says,' Globe
and Mail, 13 June 2001, All.
23 Senior Canadian military officers have already suggested the Canadian Arctic as
an alternative site for a key BMD radar station if Denmark refuses permission for its
construction in Greenland. See Jeff Sallot, 'Canada won't cede priority to the u.s.,
Graham vows,' Globe and Mail, 2 March 2002, A8.
24 .. NORAD" into the 21St century: entering the 21st century,' at
www.norad.mil/21stcent.htm; NORAD Vision 2oo, at ww.norad.mil/vision 2olo.htm.
25 Eric Schmitt, 'Testing a missile and a treaty,' New York Times, 30 January 2000, 5
4,4-
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Canadian military expenditure and divert resources from other areas of
government activity.
Proponents of BMD, including the us secretary of defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, have indicated that the weaponization of space is their ulti-
mate goal.26 Agreement on an integrated command could thus be the
first step towards Canadian participation in the weaponization of space
- again, without a full national debate,27 even though as recently as 1998,
Canada called for a committee within the Conference on Disarmament
to negotiate a convention banning all weapons from space.28
Military Expenditure
Canadian participation in a us-led integrated command, or even
some less extensive or less formalized arrangement, would likely entail
increased military expenditure. Military interoperability requires
roughly equal levels of technology - and modern weapons' technolo-
gy comes at considerable price. The us maintains a level of military
expenditure that, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), is
more than twice that of Canada.29 Indeed, its total military expendi-
ture exceeds that of the eight next highest spending countries com-
bined. Closer military co-operation could thus result in substantial,
perhaps irresistible, pressure on Canada to increase spending signifi-
cantly." Matching us levels would cost more than $16 billion (us$10
billion) in additional funds each year. In the absence of a full nation-
al debate on the implications of closer military co-operation for mili-
tary expenditure, the result could be significant increases in defence
spending by stealth.
Any debate about spending should also consider the kinds of sol-
diers and equipment Canada needs and wants. A move towards closer
26 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization, Washington, DC (Public Law 1o6-65), 11 January
2001 (Rumsfeld Commission'), at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space2oololi.html.
27 For a report on secret government documents concerning Canada's possible
involvement in the weaponization of space, see Jeff Sallot, 'Canada moves closer to
u.s. orbit,' Globe and Mail, 27 February 2002, AS.
28 See 'The Canadian position on arms control in outer space,' at www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/arms/outer3-e.asp; Jeff Sallot, 'u.s. global dominance prompting
review of defence, foreign policies, Graham says,' Globe and Mail, 15 April 2002, A4.
29 In 1999, Canada spent us$8 billion (1.3 per cent of its GDP) on its military; the us
spent us$275 billion (3.o per cent of its GDP). Figures available at www.sipri.org.
30 For an early indication of pressure, see Cellucci, 'North American security.'
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military co-operation could divert money away from tasks, such as
United Nations peacekeeping, that the US tends to avoid and in which
Canada has traditionally specialized, and away from the equipment
best suited for those tasks?'
Bilingualism in the Armed Forces
Nearly a third of Canadian forces personnel are francophone. The
Department of National Defence has sought to meet stringent obliga-
tions under the Official Languages Act with procedures ensuring equal
status to French and English?2 Nonetheless, assuring equality for the
French language remains a challenge and will become even more diffi-
cult within a us-led integrated command. United States commanders
lack patience for foreign procedures aimed at protecting the status of a
foreign language. And the factual protection that their size affords
francophone personnel would be diminished if those forces were sub-
sumed, to one degree or another, within the far larger, English-speak-
ing forces of the us. Any agreement on closer military co-operation
would have to include carefully designed mechanisms to ensure that
the Canadian forces remain a truly bilingual institution.
Women in the Military
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires gender equality. As a
result, the Canadian forces are engaged in an ongoing effort to create
opportunities for women and to prevent sexual harassment and assault.
Women are now allowed to serve in all capacities, including combat
roles. This is not the case in the United States, which also seems to have
more significant problems with sexual harassment and assault.31
Under an integrated command, Canadian personnel would operate
side-by-side with us personnel. The presence of women in certain roles
may cause friction that would be uncomfortable, perhaps even danger-
ous, to female Canadian personnel. A US commander might want to
exclude female Canadian soldiers from certain aspects of an operation,
31 See Douglas Bland, 'Canada and military coalitions: where, how and with
whom?' Policy Matters/Enjeux publics 3(February 2002), 32-41.
32 See, for example, www.dnd.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/5o39/oe.asp.
33 Francine D'Amico & Laurie Weinstein, Gender Camouflage: Women and the U.S.
Military (New York: NYU Press 1999); Linda Bird Francke, Ground Zero: The Gender
Wars in the Military (New York: Simon & Schuster 1997).
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in accordance with us policy but in violation of Canadian policy and
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The us might put pressure on
Canada to bring its policy into line, so as to promote the more effective
functioning of the two armed forces. Therefore, any agreement on
closer military co-operation would have to specify that Canada's poli-
cy on women in the armed forces would not be affected.
Gay and Lesbian Military Personnel
The issue of sexual minorities in the military has provoked controver-
sy in several countries. The current us policy is 'don't ask, don't tell' -
homosexuality is still prohibited, even if the witch-hunts of the past are
no longer supposed to occur.34 Nonetheless, gay and lesbian soldiers in
the us risk discharge if they complain about harassment or violence.31
Canada's approach is more liberal. Gay and lesbian personnel are
benignly allowed - perhaps even encouraged on diversity grounds - sub-
ject to the same constraints on sexual activity that apply to all personnel
regardless of sexual orientation. 36 A 1992 Federal Court decision based
on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms means that same sex partners
are accorded many of the same benefits as partners of different sexes.3 7
What would happen to this approach if Canadian forces were placed
under a us-led integrated command? Would gay and lesbian soldiers
be at risk of punishment from their commanding officers? Would they
risk harassment from us soldiers accustomed to an environment in
which overt homosexuality is proscribed? Would it be right (would it
be legal?) to subject gay and lesbian Canadian soldiers to us opera-
tional control if such questions had not been fully answered and strong
protections put in place? Would Canada come under pressure to revise
its policy? These questions all need to be answered, and procedures and
protections have to be designed carefully, before Canada commits itself
to any agreement with the United States.
34 Roberto Suro, 'Military's differing lesson plans reflect unease on gay policy,'
Washington Post, 4 March 2000, Al.
35 Roberto Suro, 'Military's discharges of gays increase; army base where anti-gay
murder occurred had record number of departures,' ibid, 2 June 2001, A2o; Vernon
Loeb, '1,250 gays left forces in 'ol; harassment cited in largest exodus from military
since '87,' ibid, 14 March 2002, A4.
36 'Women, gays can make army better, general says,' Globe and Mail, 2 March
1998, A3.
37 www.forces.ca/hr/dcba/engraph/travel removal/Same SexBenefits_e.asp;
Douglas v Canada, 98 Dominion Law Reports 129 (1992).
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Safety of Soldiers
A country that submits its soldiers to the operational control of anoth-
er country risks putting those soldiers in somewhat greater danger.
Canadians remember the slaughter on the beaches of Dieppe and the
capture of soldiers in Hong Kong; New Zealanders and Australians the
massive losses in Gallipoli. British commanders, some believe, regard-
ed the lives of Commonwealth soldiers as less valuable than those of
British soldiers and thus gave the most dangerous tasks to them. Such
behaviour is somewhat understandable: generals and politicians are
accountable to their own citizens, not to the citizens of other countries,
and there is little that plays worse at home than losses on the battlefield.
After 18 uS Rangers were killed in Somalia in 1991, it became
accepted wisdom that the us public would no longer tolerate the
deaths of service personnel abroad. After 11 September 2001, this
accepted wisdom changed - though perhaps only temporarily. Once it
began to lose soldiers in Afghanistan, the us immediately called in
1700 mountain-trained British marines.3 8
Is the risk worth bearing if the us were to focus its efforts on the rel-
atively safe high-tech tasks of air and naval support while Canada pro-
vided ground troops, at least for the more dangerous missions? Would
us commanders, consciously or unconsciously, provide lower quality
air support for Canadian than for us soldiers? Would they assign
Canadian soldiers to tasks for which they are inappropriately trained or
equipped? It is impossible to answer these questions in the abstract or
to secure foolproof protection through assurances that could, in the
heat of battle, fall by the wayside. The key question here is: do
Canadians trust us commanders to treat the lives of Canadian soldiers
with as much care as they treat the lives of their own soldiers?
Promoting the National Interest
A countrys national interest might not be the top priority of the for-
eign army to which it has given operational control. In 1967, King
Hussein ofJordan saw his troops, which he had placed under Egyptian
command, ordered into combat in Jerusalem and the West Bank, thus
opening a second front in the Six Day War. Jordan lost the Old City of
38 Richard Norton-Taylor & Rory McCarthy, 'British troops face elusive Afghan foe:
reinforcements sent to help struggling Americans catch Taliban and al-Qaida fight-
ers who beat the bombing,' Guardian, 19 March 2002,13.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL Winter 2002-2003 103
Michael Byers
Jerusalem and the West Bank as a result. 9 In any military conflict, com-
manders have to assign priorities for the deployment of soldiers and
equipment. As Canada contemplates closer military co-operation, it will
have to ask who that co-operation is designed to protect. Are us com-
manders likely to give the same priority to protecting the residents of St
John's, Newfoundland, as to the residents of Raleigh, North Carolina? Is
it possible that Canadian soldiers and equipment would be diverted
from the task of protecting Canada and towards protecting the us?
Canada clearly does not have the soldiers or the equipment to pro-
tect itself against a major military attack. In this unlikely situation,
Canada would be heavily reliant on the us. But Canadian forces are
able to protect the country against many threats, and may - depending
on the financial support they receive - become even more capable in
future.
If Canada was unable to deal with an attack on its own, the other
members of NATO, including the us, are obligated to come to its assis-
tance under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is therefore possi-
ble that, by placing a significant part of its armed forces under us oper-
ational control, Canada could be losing rather than gaining security.
Structuring an agreement with the us that securely protects Canada's
national interest would be a major challenge.
Safety of Civilians
Canadians should be concerned about the implications of closer mili-
tary co-operation for their personal safety. Around the world,
Canadians benefit from considerable goodwill. They are rarely the
deliberate targets of terrorist attacks - and when they are, it is not
because they are Canadian.
As a result of the position of the us in the world, and aspects of its
foreign policy, Americans do not benefit from the same degree of
goodwill. They are sometimes the targets of terrorist attacks simply
because they are American. If Canada were to become more closely
identified with the us, particularly with its military and foreign policy,
they might be subject to the same kinds of attacks.
Closer military co-operation might also increase the risk of terrorist
attacks on Canadian soil. Britain felt the need to increase domestic
39 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Allen
Lane/Penguin 2000), 244.
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security after it participated with the us in the enforcement of no-fly
zones in Iraq and repeated bombings of Baghdad. Prime Minister Tony
Blair's highly public support for the us since 11 September has meant
even further, more dramatic, security measures. 0
Military co-operation in multilateral contexts does not carry the
same risks. For half a century, Canada has been a NATO partner with-
out being perceived as inextricably linked to the us. Canada has placed
its soldiers under temporary us command in operations authorized by
the United Nations - again, without being perceived as a us satellite. To
avoid becoming a target, even a trilateral arrangement involving
Mexico is preferable to a closer bilateral relationship with the us.
LEGAL ISSUES
Under the Canadian Defence Act, it is an offence for any member of
the Canadian forces to obey an unlawful order.4' However, this article
does not focus on possible violations of domestic or international law
by individual soldiers. My concern is with the ability of the Canadian
forces as an institution, and of Canada as a country, to abide by their
legal obligations.
Charter ofRights and Freedoms
Canadian forces are required to abide by the 1982 Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, even when they are outside the country. Section 32(1)
reads, in part: 'This Charter applies ... a) to the Parliament and gov-
ernment of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of
Parliament.'
The Charter was probably violated in January 2002 when Canadian
forces in Afghanistan transferred Taliban or Al-Qaeda suspects to the
United States without obtaining assurances that the death penalty
would not be applied if those suspects were convicted of terrorist or
other offences. 42 In April 2001, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled
that Canada could not extradite two men accused of murder in the us,
unless us authorities guaranteed that they would not face execution if
40 See, for example, Owen Bowcott & Audrey Gillan, 'Allies try to calm fears of ter-
rorist retaliation: Worldwide warning to us citizens,' Guardian, 8 October 2001, 4,
41 Revised Statutes 1985, c. N-5, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-
5/index.html.
42 Shawn McCarthy & Steven Chase, 'Handover of captives by Canadian troops
sparks Ottawa storm,' Globe and Mail, 30 January 2002, Al.
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convicted.4 Such assurances, the Court held, were constitutionally
required in all but exceptional cases.
Because the Charter does not distinguish extradition from other
forms of transfer, it is likely that the Court would adopt the same
approach to the transfer of suspects detained during combat. And
though the crimes the suspects in Afghanistan were thought to have
committed may have constituted exceptional cases, the suspects had
the right to have a Canadian court determine the issue. Article 24(1) of
the Charter reads: 'Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by
this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.'
Any agreement on closer military co-operation should stipulate that
individuals detained by Canadian soldiers would, if transferred to us
authorities, not be subject to capital punishment - unless the Canadian
courts first determined that the circumstances were exceptional.
1949 Geneva Convention III
In January 2002, it became clear that differing interpretations of cer-
tain treaties, and differing degrees of commitment to those treaties,
raised the possibility that Canadian soldiers could be ordered by their
us commanders to perform actions in violation of Canada's obligations
under international law.4
The most obvious potential conflict concerned the us refusal to
apply article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War to detainees at the us naval base at
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The article reads, in part: 'Should any
doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy [are prisoners of war] ...
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.'
In the opinion of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
43 Burns v United States [2001] 1 Supreme Court Reports 283, available at www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/judgments/index-e.html.
44 Alan Freeman, 'Legal expert sees trouble in war role,' Globe and Mail, 15 January
2002, Al; Daniel LeBlanc, 'Pow storm intensifies, troops join u.s. force,' ibid, 18
January 2002, Al.
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Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and a number of
European leaders at least some of the detainees were prisoners of war
(PoWs) .5 It is difficult to see how these opinions could not but raise
doubt about the status of the detainees.
Canada initially adopted a position on article 5 that differed from
that of the us. On 16 January 2002, a Department of National
Defence spokesperson said: All the individuals ... captured or detained
will be afforded humane treatments, according to the standards that
are applicable to PoWs, and that's according to international law ... If
there is any doubt as to whether or not they are entitled to that treat-
ment, they will be treated as such until a special tribunal, or a properly
constituted tribunal, has determined that this person is or isn't a
PoW.' 6 However, it soon emerged that Canadian soldiers handed
Taliban or Al-Qaeda suspects over to the us at a time when the us pub-
licly refused to apply article 5.47
The fact that the Canadians were under US operational control does
not absolve Canada of the apparent treaty violation. Article 12 of
Geneva Convention III reads: 'Prisoners of war may only be transferred
by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a Party to the Convention
and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and
ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention ... if th[e
receiving] Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in
any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were
transferred shall ... take effective measures to correct the situation or
shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be
complied with.'4"
Other possible violations flow from the apparent violations of arti-
cles 5 and 12. For example, the us is proposing to prosecute at least
some of the detainees before special military commissions that have
different rules of evidence and procedure from regular us military or
45 John Mintz, 'Treatment of detainees in Cuba questioned; human rights groups
urge u.s. to declare Taliban, A Qaeda members Pows,' Washington Post, 16 January
2002, A13; T.R. Reid, 'u.s. pressed on detainees' treatment; concern grows abroad
about rights of Al Qaeda, Taliban fighters held in Cuba,' ibid, 17 January 2002, A15.
46 Quoted in Daniel Leblanc, 'Canada defies u.s. on POws,' Globe and Mail, 17
January 2002, Al.
47 Shawn McCarthy & Steven Chase, 'Handover of captives.'
48 Available at www.icrc.org/ihl.
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civilian courts."9 Yet article 102 of the Convention states: 'A prisoner of
war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced
by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.' Canada, as the
country responsible for the apprehension of some of the detainees,
might be in violation of article 102 if any of them are tried, convicted,
and sentenced by a special military commission.
The issue of PoWs, along with all the other issues identified in this
article, could easily arise within the North American context. For
example, a Canadian frigate under us operational control could detain
foreign combatants on a vessel within the 500-mile offshore zone
assigned to the Northern Command. Any agreement on closer mili-
tary co-operation should therefore stipulate that any detainees trans-
ferred to us authorities must be accorded the full protections of the
Geneva Conventions - as interpreted by Canada.
1977Additional ProtocolI
The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
concerns the protection of civilians during international armed con-
flict. Canada has ratified protocol I; the us has not. Canadian soldiers
consequently operate under more stringent treaty obligations than us
soldiers with regard to the protection of civilians. During the Kosovo
campaign, those differences in obligations were taken into account in
assigning targets and configuring forces. Canadian fighter pilots, for
instance, were not assigned as wingmen to us fighter pilots because of
their more stringent restraints on targeting, which meant that they
could not respond to certain threats in the same way. Any agreement
on closer military co-operation would have to include similar arrange-
ments, of a legally binding character, to ensure that Canadian soldiers
were not ordered into actions that, while legal for us soldiers, might be
illegal for Canadians.
There is also the question of whether Canadians want their soldiers
under the operational control of a country that has not accepted the
49 See George W. Bush, Military Order of 13 November 2001, 'Detention, treatment
and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism,' Federal Register 66(16
November 2001), 57,833, available at www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/
aces/acesl4o.html. The rules governing the operation of the commissions were
published as Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, 21 March
2002, at www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d2oo2o32iord.pdf.
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same level of obligations for the protection of civilians. For example, in
the Kosovo campaign the us targeted water filtration plants.10 Had the
us ratified protocol I, this might have been in violation of article 52(2):
'Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective con-
tribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.' For Canadians, targeting water filtration
plants might be unacceptable, not simply because of Canada's obliga-
tions, but also as a policy approach by a country wanting to exercise
control over its armed forces.
Weapons that Cause Unnecessary Suffering
Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffer-
ing."1 This prohibition is also contained in article 23(1)(e) of the regu-
lations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, to which the us is
a parry and which is unanimously considered to reflect customary
international law. However, the us has a very restrictive understanding
of what the term 'unnecessary' means.
Canada's obligations could be violated if Canadian soldiers used
some us weapons, such as munitions containing depleted uranium.
Although the danger of depleted uranium has yet to be proved, its use
has caused considerable concern.52 A credible argument can be made
that, in situations of uncertainty, Canada should take a 'precautionary
approach' and not put its soldiers in positions where they might
employ such weapons.
Ottawa Landmines Convention
Canada has ratified the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
50 Marcus Gee, 'Death of innocents,' Globe and Mail, 1i March 2000, A14.
51 Article 35(2) reads: 'It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and materials
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suf-
fering.'
52 'NATo warned about risks of ammunition; Germans were advised in 1999 of possi-
ble toxic threat from depleted-uranium rounds,' Globe and Mail, 8 January 2001,
A13; Andrew Mitrovica, 'Canadians to be tested for depleted uranium: Ottawa quiet-
ly sending two doctors to check up to 300 civil servants in Balkans,' ibid, 17
February 2001, AlO; Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Cancer risk "hard to avoid in battle,"'
Guardian, 13 January 2001, 9.
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Mines and on Their Destruction. The us has not, and continues to use
landmines. If Canadian soldiers were to participate in the use, stock-
piling, or transfer of landmines - even if ordered to do so by a us com-
mander - they would violate Canada's obligations under article 1:
'Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) to use anti-personnel mines;
(b) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or trans-
fer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
(c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.'
Under article 9, Canada is obligated to prevent any prohibited activ-
ity from taking place on its territory. United States forces operating in
Canada could therefore have nothing to do with landmines. Any
agreement with the us should include this specific limitation.
Finally, Canada gained international influence as a result of its large-
ly successful effort to ban landmines. What will happen if it decides to
place a substantial part of its armed forces under operational control of
a country that continues to defy the international community on this
key humanitarian issue?
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Canada has ratified the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC); the us is implacably opposed to this new insti-
tution.5 3 The icc has jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by the nationals of its states parties, including
Canadian forces regardless of whose command they are under. If ever
Canadian soldiers are accused of such crimes, Canada, if it does not
want the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction, will have to make good faith
efforts to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute those soldiers.
This raises potentially serious practical concerns for closer military co-
operation with the us.
Consider one of the US concerns - the crime of knowingly causing
excessive 'collateral damage' in a military attack (article 8(2)(b)(iv)).
The us does not want the ICC to second-guess command decisions.
What would happen if Canadian soldiers, acting under us operational
53 See, for example, Pierre-Richard Prosper, ambassador-at-large for war crimes
issues, 'Address, The Hague, 19 December 2oo1,' at www.state.gov/s/wci/rls/
rm/8o53.htm.
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control, were accused of taking part in such an attack? Would
Canadian courts or the ICC find Canadian nationals responsible even
as their us commanders remained free of investigation? If Canada had
the right to withhold Canadian troops from the assignments, and did
not do so, would Canadian military and civilian superiors be criminal-
ly responsible for failing to prevent the crime (article 28)?
Or consider part 9 of the Rome Statute, which sets out stringent
obligations on international co-operation and judicial assistance.
These include co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of
crimes, for instance by providing documentation (article 87) and by
surrendering to the ICC any persons requested by it who are found
within the territory of the requested state party (article 89). In partic-
ular, if a state party receives both a request for surrender from the ICC
and an extradition request from another country, it must give priority
to the ICC (article 90).
Canadian soldiers under us operational control might detain some-
one wanted by both the ICC and us authorities. Those soldiers might
then have to choose between operational orders and Canada's obliga-
tions under the Rome Statute. Or, to provide an even more difficult
example, what would happen if the ICC requested the transfer of a us
soldier deployed in Canada?
Article 98(2) allows a state parry to refuse to surrender a foreign
national to the ICC if another agreement prevents this. The provision
was included at the insistence of the us, which will now likely press for
the inclusion of 'no surrender' clauses in all its status of forces agree-
ments. Such agreements have become highly controversial as instru-
ments for limiting the jurisdiction of the ICC - and it is not clear
whether, and in what form, Canada should agree to such a clause. This
issue deserves careful study before any decision on closer military co-
operation is made.
What effect might closer military co-operation have on the ability of
the Canadian government - as distinct from the Canadian forces - to
co-operate with the ICC? Would Canada feel free to transfer classified
information to the ICC if a significant portion of its armed forces were
under us operational control? Would ICC agents be allowed to conduct
investigations in Canada if the country were part of a North American
security zone under a us-led integrated command?
These questions are rendered more difficult by the fact that Canada
played a leading role in the development of the ICC and continues to
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campaign actively on its behalf.54 Any agreement with the us would
have to spell out that, in the event of any conflict of obligation or inter-
est, the Rome Statute would prevail.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Article 6 of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states that:
'Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective inter-
national control.'" Recent statements and reports suggest that the us,
which has ratified the NPT, is violating article 6. Canada will want to
consider the implications of closer military co-operation with a coun-
try in possible breach of this key arms control treaty.
Attention should also be paid to article 2: 'Each non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'
Canada would be in violation if its soldiers were placed in control of us
nuclear weapons. More importantly, since the prohibition extends to indi-
rect possession or control, the participation of Canadian soldiers in opera-
tions involving nuclear weapons, or at least the deployment of such
weapons on Canadian territory, might bring Canada into violation.
Any agreement with the us should stipulate that Canadian soldiers
are never to be placed in control of nuclear weapons, that they are
never to participate in operations involving such weapons, and that
such weapons are never to be deployed in Canada.
CONCLUSIONS
A decision on closer military co-operation with the us should be pre-
ceded by a full public debate and should involve a well-defined role for
parliament. Such a debate would likely establish that the proposed
assignment of 'operational control' to us generals has consequences for
54 www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign-policy/icc/welcome-en.asp.
55 www.unog.ch/disarm/distreat/warfare.htm.
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Canadian sovereignty, and that establishing a Northern Command is
more than a simple reorganization of the us military. The debate
should involve Canada's northern peoples and should not be rushed by
outside pressure.
Alternatives to a closer bilateral relationship should be considered.
Strengthening the existing global framework through the United
Nations, the north Atlantic framework through NATO, and the north-
ern framework through the Arctic Council would be a better
approach. Security matters are not limited to continental North
America. Strong multilateral institutions exist and consistently work in
Canada's favour. Canada should work with countries around the
world, including the United States, to strengthen those institutions,
not undermine them, even unintentionally, by developing a closer mil-
itary relationship with one country.
Canada should focus on a broader, multifaceted approach to securi-
ty such as a global network of intelligence, police, and judicial co-oper-
ation, designed collaboratively to impede terrorist planning and detain
and prosecute those who would perpetrate such crimes. Canada's
strong backing for the icc is one example of its support for non-mili-
tary, multilateral approaches. Greater support for United Nations anti-
terrorism efforts should be a priority.
Mexico shares many of Canada's interests and concerns and could be
a valuable ally within a North American security structure. It makes
considerable sense for Canada, Mexico, and the United States to nego-
tiate security matters trilaterally. Concerns about maintaining a 'spe-
cial relationship' with the us should be dismissed. The claims of many
countries - Australia, Britain, Ireland, Israel, Japan, and so on - are just
as legitimate as Canada's.
The Canadian government should develop a basic national
regime setting out conditions and procedures for the placement of
Canadian soldiers and equipment in coalition with foreign armed
forces. These 'Canadian Rules,' as Douglas Bland calls them, would
have to be detailed enough to ensure that concerns about sovereign-
ty were fully taken into account and that Canada remained fully
able to respect its domestic and international legal obligations and
policies on matters such as bilingualism, gender, and sexual equality
in the armed forces.
Given the potential implications for Canadian sovereignty and for-
eign policy, a brief exchange of notes or memoranda of agreement with
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the us is not enough. In 1958, NORAD was established through an
exchange of notes. In other words, parliament was bypassed in the cre-
ation of what became a permanent feature of Canadian defence policy.
That mistake should not be repeated.
NORAD exists on a five-year renewable basis. Such an approach gives
Canadian governments the option of not renewing if circumstances or
policies change.
Specific permission must be granted before foreign forces can enter
Canada's north. This will ensure that Canada's claim to sovereignty
remains intact.
Military expenditure should be based on Canadian priorities, inter-
ests, and values. Military co-operation with the United States is obvi-
ously important, but it should not detract from Canada's ability to
patrol and protect Canadian territory - including the Arctic - and to
mount peacekeeping operations overseas. It is also important that the
Canadian military develop an improved capacity for lift, logistics, and
intelligence gathering. A moderate increase in defence spending may
be required to achieve those aims.
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